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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

Case No.

v.
Category No. 13

FRANK DAVID GENTRY,
Defendant-Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole question presented for review is whether the
court of appeals erroneously held that State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a "strict compliance" with rule 11(5),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which supersedes the "record as
a whole" test traditionally applied on review to determine
whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on August 24,
1990, and appears in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah
Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1990) (a copy of the court's opinion is
contained in the addendum).
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Frank David Gentry, was charged with theft
by deception, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6405 (1990), and criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor, under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (1990).
After defendant pled not guilty to the charges, trial
commenced before the district court sitting without a jury.
After the close of the evidence, but prior to closing arguments,
defendant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of theft, a
third degree felony.
charge.

The State dismissed the criminal trespass

The trial court stayed imposition of sentence and placed

defendant on eighteen months' probation.
Over two months after the acceptance of his guilty
plea, defendant moved to withdraw it.

The trial court denied

this motion.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea
and remanded the case for a new trial on the original charges.
State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 24,
1990).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A recitation of the facts of defendant's crimes is not
necessary for purposes of this petition.

The relevant facts are

those stated above in the Statement of the Case.

The facts underlying the charges against defendant are
accurately summarized in the court of appeals' opinion. Gentry,
141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26-27.
-2-

ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT
STATE V, GIBBONS/ 740 P.2D 1309 (UTAH 1987) ,
ADOPTED A TEST OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE
11(5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
WHICH SUPERSEDES THE "RECORD AS A WHOLE" TEST
TRADITIONALLY APPLIED ON REVIEW TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
On appeal to the court of appeals, defendant argued,
inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because "the trial court
failed to explain to [him] the elements and facts of the crime of
theft before he pled guilty, and . . . further erred by relying
on an incomplete record as a substitute for Rule 11 compliance[]
in determining that [he] entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences."

State v. Gentry, 141 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 27. The State responded that, under the "record as
a whole" test traditionally applied by this Court on postconviction review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea, see,
e.g., Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
110 S. Ct. 751 (1990); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah
1988); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per
2
curiam), the trial court had not abused its discretion.

The "record as a whole" test was stated in Miller as follows:
[T]he absence of a finding under [rule 11] is
not critical so long as the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the
rights he was waiving.
718 P.2d at 405.
-3-

In reversing and remanding to allow defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea, the court of appeals definitively
rejected the State's argument that the "record as a whole" test
applied, concluding that in State v. Gibbons, this Court
"effectively replac[ed] the 'record as a whole' test with a
strict Rule 11(5) compliance test in accepting a defendant's
guilty plea,"

Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28—i.e., if the

trial court has not strictly complied with rule 11(5), the guilty
plea, although perhaps otherwise voluntary, must automatically be
vacated.

This conclusion misconstrues Gibbons and ignores

significant language in both pre-Gibbons and post-Gibbons
opinions of this Court that clearly cuts against the notion that
Gibbons abandoned the record as a whole test for determining the
voluntariness, and thus validity, of a guilty plea.
In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas.

Rather, the

Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on
the voluntariness of a guilty plea must first be presented to the
trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, concluded that
"a statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in
all trial courts in this state is appropriate."
P.2d at 1312.

Gibbons, 740

It then set out the specific requirements for

taking of guilty pleas under rule 11 for the purpose of assisting
the trial court on remand in determining the validity of the
defendant's pleas.

Ibid.

The Gibbons Court did not even mention

the record as a whole test for determining voluntariness of a

-4-

guilty plea, and the reason seems obvious:

the Court was not

reviewing the trial court record to determine the voluntariness
of the defendant's pleas.

Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion

that Gibbons replaced the record as a whole test with a strict
compliance test reads far too much into Gibbons.

The Gibbons

Court simply did not address that issue.
Furthermore, certain language in several post-Gibbons
opinions of this Court strongly suggests that the record as a
whole test was not modified by Gibbons.

For example, in Jolivet

v. Cook, this Court stated:
We first address Jolivet's claim that his
guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary.
Specifically, Jolivet argues that Judge Burns
erred in the taking of his guilty pleas
because he did not make findings that Jolivet
understood the elements of each crime charged
and how those elements related to the facts,
as required by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), or that Jolivet knew the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences. In fact, Jolivet claims that he
did not know or understand these things when
he entered his pleas.
[Rule 11(5)(d)] requires that before a
trial court accepts a guilty plea, it must
find that the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he or she is entering the plea. In Gibbons,
this Court stated that in making this
finding, the trial court must ensure that the
defendant understands "the elements of the
crimes charged and the relationship of the
law to the facts." Id. at 1312. In
addition, [rule 11(5)(e)] requires that
before the trial court accepts a guilty plea,
it must find that the defendant knows of the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences. The record clearly shows that at
the time the guilty pleas were accepted,
Judge Burns did not make the findings
required by [rule 11(5)], i.e., that Jolivet
understood the elements of each crime charged
and how these elements related to the facts
-5-

and that Jolivet knew the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences.
However, this Court has held, "[T]he absence
of a finding under [rule 11] is not critical
so long as the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the
rights he was waiving." State v. Miller, 718
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris,
709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v.
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985).
784 P.2d at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted).

And in State v.

Copeland, the Court, without citing Gibbons, said:
The United States Supreme Court has said,
"[T]here is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the
plea is entered the defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charge against him."
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173
(emphasis in the original). We think the
most effective way to do this is to have the
defendant state in his own words his
understanding of the offense and the actions
which make him guilty of the offense. By
this statement, the trial court can assure
itself that the defendant is truly submitting
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the
record on appeal will clearly reflect the
defendant's understanding. Although this
method is therefore preferable to others, it
is not absolutely required. The test is
voluntariness. We hold that the record
demonstrates that defendant admitted acts
sufficient to justify his conviction of the
offense to which he pleaded guilty.
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
Although both Jolivet and Copeland involved pre-Gibbons
guilty pleas, Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, this Court did
not note or attach any significance to that fact in either
opinion, and, in fact, directly applied Gibbons in Jolivet in
concluding that although the trial court did not strictly comply
with rule 11, the record as a whole demonstrated that Jolivet

-6-

entered his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily.

Jolivet# 784

P.2d at 1149-51. This seriously undermines the court of appeals'
effort to distinguish Jolivet and Copeland on the basis that the
record as a whole test was applied in those cases because they
3
involved pre-Gibbons guilty pleas.
Significantly, in State v.
Smith/ 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), which involved a post-Gibbons
guilty plea, this Court apppeared to apply the record as whole
test in reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's
4
motion to withdraw.
Finally, that the record as a whole test represents the
most reasonable standard upon which to assess a post-conviction
attack on the voluntariness of a guilty plea is made clear in the
following passage from State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986):
A final word on the State's Rule 11
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that
was struck, the State has argued, in effect,
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty
pleas should always be voided when the trial
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well.
This position is shortsighted, for to follow

It is not clear what significance State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d
670 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), which was issued five days before
Jolivet, has in this inquiry. Unlike Jolivet, Hickman declined
to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons guilty plea on the ground that
Gibbons represented a clear break from the past and would
therefore not be applied retroactively. Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672
n.l. Insofar as Hickman might be read to support the court of
appeals' strict compliance test, it is inconsistent with Jolivet
and should not be followed.
4
The court of appeals obviously disagrees with this reading of
Smith, having cited it in support of its decision in the instant
case, Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, and stating directly in
State v. Pharris, Case No. 890549-CA, slip op. at 8 n.6 (Utah Ct.
App. Sept. 14, 1990), a case issued after Gentry, that Smith
applied the "strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons."
-7-

it would be to sanction a remedy far worse
than the wrong. If we were to to hold any
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the
resultant plea, even when the plea is
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would
encourage defendant's, convicted and
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their
convictions for purely tactical reasons,
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas
corpus long after the fact. We have refused
to overturn convictions upon such challenges
in the past, e.g., State v. Knowles, Utah,
709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah,
709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic] and we find no
reason to encourage such attacks in the
future.
Overturning such convictions—which we
would have to do if we embraced the rationale
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's
concurring opinion—would require the State
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably
long after the challenged guilty pleas were
entered and when the passage of time would
make reprosecution impractical, if not
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate
result would be to free a number of convicted
persons for nothing more than technical
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary
guilty pleas.
5
717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote omitted) . This view is consistent
with the harmless error rule long recognized by this court in a
variety of contexts.

See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071

5
Most jurisdictions apply a record as a whole test rather than
the strict compliance rule adopted by the court of appeals. See,
e.g., United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1990)
(district court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does
not warrant reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived
was otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App. 179, 378
S.E.2d 520 (Ga. App. 1989) (where defendant was otherwise
informed of rights waived, harmless error standard is applied to
trial court's failure to comply with rule governing taking of
pleas); People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448 N.W.2d 781,
783 (Mich. App. 1989) ("record as a whole" demonstrated that plea
was made knowingly and voluntarily); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d
9, 459 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1983) (voluntariness of plea determined
by considering all relevent circumstances surrounding it, not by
judge's ritualistic recitation of rights waived).
-8-

(Utah 1989) (harmless error standard for nonconstitutional
error); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("with
respect to certain constitutional errors, we must place on the
State the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt").

See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R.

Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61.

Interestingly, the court of

appeals did not so much as mention Kay, even though the State
cited the foregoing quoted language from Kay to it in its brief.
See State v. Gentry, Case No. 890145-CA, Br. of Appellee at 1718.
In sum, a careful reading of Gibbons and this Court's
pre- and post-Gibbons decisions indicates that the court of
appeals erred in holding that Gibbons replaced the record as a
whole test with a strict compliance test.

A strict compliance

test is not required either by Gibbons or logic.
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari because
the court of appeals has rendered a decision on a question of law
which is in conflict with decisions of this Court.
P. 46(b).

Utah R. App.

Insofar as the issue of what standard applies on

review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is unsettled in
light of Gibbons, certiorari should be granted because the court
of appeals has decided an important question of law which should
be settled by this Court.

Utah R. App. P. 46(d).

-9-

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State's petition
for certiorari should be granted pursuant to rule 46(b) or (d),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

/

RESPECTFULLY submitted this ££

day of September,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

^Wt^
DAVID B. THOMPSON
^
Assistant Attorney General
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,-„

Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to George T.
Waddoups, Attorney for Respondent, 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84107, this o?^Slav of September, 1990.
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ADDENDUM

been excluded, if the defense was not to be
permitted to call AJvin Barker in rebuttal.
Having concluded that the court erred in
failing to exclude Deputy Troester's restatement of AJvin Barker's opinion of Deputy
Naylor's performance, we^must now consider
whether this error was harmless or prejudicial.
An error is harmless, and not grounds for
reversing a conviction, if, absent the error,
there is no substantial likelihood of a better
result for the defendant. Utah R. Crim. P.
30(a); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140
(Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 116,
120-122 (Utah 1989).
In this case, one of the main points of the
defense was that Deputy Naylor's use of force
was excessive and overly aggressive. There
were substantial factual discrepancies between
the eyewitnesses' accounts of what happened,
and Deputy Naylor's account (from which we
have drawn the above statement of the facts)
tends more to justify his role in this altercation than do the accounts of the Barker
parents and of Gary Barker. In resolving this
factual conflict, the testimony of Alvin Barker
may well have been important. Alvin Barker
intervened m the fight to aid Deputy Naylor in
ending the struggle, but at trial, he saw no
need for the deputy's resort to violence and
portrayed Gary Barker's actions as mainly
evasive and self-protective. Thus, the jury
could well have found that Alvin Barker's
testimony was critical in determining what
happened, assessing the extent and nature of
Gary Barker's resistance, and in evaluating his
claim of self-defense.
Given the conflicting evidence, and also in
view of the rather lengthy jury deliberations,
this appears to have been a close case factually. We therefore conclude that, if Alvin
Barker's hearsay statement had been excluded
or if Alvin Barker had been permitted to
testify concerning it, there is a significant
possibility of a result more favorable to the
defendant Gary Barker.
We therefore reverse and remand.
Robert L. Newey, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge,
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1990).
2. Deputy Naylor was the only witness called by the
State who was present when the crime was committed. Since the jury found for the State, we view the
facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
convictions, State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285
(Utah 1989). We have therefore relied extensively on
Deputy Naylor's testimony and resolved conflicts
and doubts in the evidence according to his view of
the facts.
3. See Utah R. Evid. 801(c).

Barker

CODE»CO

*» »«T »*

Provo, Uffa

4. See United States v. Brennao, 798 F.2d 581, 58789 (2d Or. 1986) cert, denied, _U.S.__, 109 S. Ct.
1003 (1989); United States v. WWiams, 751 F.2d
594, 606-10 (7th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (1985).
5. United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 686-87 (7th
Cir. 1982) cert, denied 457 U.S. 1124 (1982); United
States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971); see
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 108 S.Ct.
838, 844 (1988) (cross-examination requirement of
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) and right of confrontation
are satisfied where declarant takes the stand and
responds to questions concerning the out-of-court
statement despite claimed lack of recall); 4 D.
Louiseil & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence §419 at
179-81 (1985).
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IN T H E
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Frank David GENTRY,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890145-CA
FILED: August 24, 1990
Fifth District, Iron County
Honorable J. Philip Eves
ATTORNEYS:
George T. Waddoups, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and
Greenwood.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellant Frank D. Gentry appeals the trial
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. We reverse and remand.
Gentry was one of six children born to
Milton and Ivy Jane Gentry. Milton owned a
1,840 acre ranch located near the Beaver/
Iron County line in southern Utah. In 1949,
Gentry built a cinder block cabin on the
ranch. Since that time, Gentry worked the
ranch on a daily basis and lived in the cabin
nearly full time. Milton died in 1962 and, by
holographic will, left the ranch to Ivy Jane
and their six children. After his father died,
Gentry continued to work the ranch. In 1966,
Gentry's siblings and Ivy Jane executed a
power of attorney authorizing Gentry to
manage the ranch. When Ivy died intestate in

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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1977, Gentry and his siblings each inherited an
equal share of the ranch.
Soon after Gentry began managing the
ranch, antagonism developed between Gentry
and his siblings. Their relationship eroded and
the family began to question Gentry's authority to manage the ranch. The ranch also
became the subject of a series of lawsuits and
court-ordered sales. In 1981, as a result of a
lawsuit to partition the ranch, the district
court ordered a sale of the ranch. Gentry's
interest in the ranch was purchased for approximately $22,000. Gentry objected to the
validity of the sale, claiming that the payment
was intended solely to reimburse him for
improvements and work he had performed on
the ranch. Several months passed before he
negotiated the check representing his sale
proceeds. He allegedly later used the money
for improvements and upkeep on the ranch.
After the 1981 partition sale, Gentry continued to use the ranch. In 1983, Gentry retained an attorney and attempted to purchase a
portion of the ranch from two of the owners,
but did not consummate any purchase. On
November 10, 1986, Gentry's brothers, Mack
and Joseph Gentry, each sold their interest in
the ranch to Dan and Paul Roberts, sons of
Gentry's sister, Mary Lou.
In 1986 and 1987, without permission from
the ranch owners, Gentry and his son, Curtis,
received payments from Carlyle Stirling for
grazing on the ranch property. They did not
transmit any of the monies collected from
Stirling to the ranch owners.
Dan and Paul Roberts brought charges of
theft by deception and criminal trespass
against Gentry and his son Curtis. Gentry and
his son countered with a civil suit for quiet
title and adverse possession against all the
ranch co-tenants.
On September 20, 1988, Gentry appeared at
an arraignment before Judge J. Philip Eves.
Gentry reviewed and signed an affidavit,
which set forth the charge of theft, but not the
alleged facts. Gentry pled not guilty.
Trial was held before Judge Eves on
January 25, 1989. After the close of evidence,
but prior to closing arguments, Gentry
changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of
theft, a third degree felony. The State dismissed the criminal trespass charge. Imposition
of sentence was stayed pending Gentry's successful completion of eighteen months probation. Conditions of probation included
Gentry agreeing to 1) not enter the ranch
property without prior written consent of Paul
or Dan Roberts, 2) not harass or offensively
communicate with any family member, 3)
dismiss his pending civil suit against persons
holding an ownership interest in the ranch
property, and 4) relinquish any interest in the
property.
On February 16, 1989, Gentry's counsel
withdrew. Gentry retained new counsel and on
UTAH ADVA

February 24, 1989, filed a notice of appeal of
the trial court's decision. On April 6, 1989,
Gentry filed a motion and supporting memorandum to withdraw his guilty plea and to
remand for a preliminary hearing. This court
stayed the appeal for sixty days or until the
trial court ruled on Gentry's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On August 28, 1989,
Gentry filed a motion for a new trial and a
motion to disqualify Judge Eves, with supporting memorandum, affidavit of Gentry, and
certificate of counsel. On September 1, 1989,
Judge Eves denied Gentry's motion to withdraw the plea, but did not rule on Gentry's
other two motions.
On appeal, Gentry argues that the trial
court erred by 1) denying Gentry's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea; 2) failing to dispose
of his motion to disqualify the trial judge; and
3) failing to dispose of his motion for a new
trial. Gentry also claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel.1
WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA
Gentry claims the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. Specifically, Gentry argues that
the trial court failed to explain to Gentry the
elements and facts of the crime of theft before
he pled guilty, and that the trial court further
erred by relying on an incomplete record as a
substitute for Rule 11 compliance, in determining that Gentry entered his plea with full
knowledge and understanding of its consequences. Gentry also asserts that his hearing
impairment precluded him from being able to
fully understand the factual elements of the
charges during the course of the trial.
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (1990) states,
in pertinent part, that "[a] plea of guilty ...
may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of court." We will
reverse the denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea only when it clearly appears the
trial court has abused its discretion by failing
to find good cause. State v. MildenhalU 747
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987); State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92,93 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Rule 11(5)2 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
The court may refuse to accept a
plea of guilty or no contest, and
may not accept the plea until the
court has found:
(d) the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense
to which he is entering the plea;
that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt; and that the plea
is an admission of all those elements....
REPORTS
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Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5).
In cases considered prior to 1987, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the record as a whole
may affirmatively establish that defendant
entered his or her guilty plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences
and of the rights waived. Stare v. Miller, 718
P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Warner
v. Morris,
709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah
1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311
(Utah 1985) (per curiam).
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987), however, the supreme court modified
its prior decisions and held that the trial court
has the burden of ensuring that Rule 11(5)
requirements are complied with when a guilty
plea is entered. Id. at 1312-13. The supreme
court stated that "to make a knowing guilty
plea, the defendants must understand the elements of the crimes charged and the relationship of the law to the facts." Id. at 1312. Gibbons noted that a sufficient affidavit may
be a starting point in determining whether a
defendant has an adequate understanding;
however, the court "should then review the
statements in the affidavit with the defendant,
question the defendant concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed by §77-35-11 on the record
before accepting the guilty plea." Id. at 1314.
If a court does not use an affidavit, the requirements in Gibbons and in Rule 11(5) must
likewise be met and be on the record. Id.
This court has interpreted Gibbons as effectively replacing the "record as a whole" test
with a strict Rule 11(5) compliance test in
accepting a defendant's guilty plea. Stare v.
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (per curiam); Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at
94. 3 The supreme court also has regarded Gibbons as a new rule of criminal procedure,
constituting a clear break with the past. State
v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah
1989) (per curiam). Consequently, both Utah
appellate courts have refused to apply the Gibbons strict compliance test to pre-Gibbons guilty
p l e a s . See,
e.g.,
Hickman,
779
P.2d at 672 n.l; Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at
94.
The State claims, however, that the "record
as a whole" test remains viable even after Gibbons. The State contends that a close
reading of Gibbons reveals that the supreme
court was simply pointing out the preferred
and safest method of determining the voluntariness of a plea. The State reasons that since
the supreme court was able to review the transcript and determine that the examination of
Gibbons was inadequate, it would have remanded the case with an order that the plea be
withdrawn rather than remanding for a
hearing on the issue of voluntariness if it intended to impose a rule of strict Rule 11 compliance. The State also relies on Jolivet v.
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Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989) and Srare v.
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) to
demonstrate that the supreme court, even after
Gibbons, relies on the "record as a whole"
test.
We cannot agree. First, the State misconstrues Gibbons. Gibbons does not simply state a
preferred method for determining the voluntariness of a plea, but clearly mandates that the
trial court must conduct an on-the-record
review with defendant of the Rule 11(5) requirements. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-14.
Also, the supreme court did not remand Gibbons for a hearing on the issue of voluntariness, but for the purpose of allowing defendant to move to withdraw his guilty plea
because he had not previously filed such
motion. Id. at 1311. Finally, it appears that
the court applied the "record as a whole" test
in Jolivet and Copeland because the guilty
pleas in both cases were entered before the Gibbons decision: Jolivet entered his plea in
1984, see State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 84344 (Utah 1986) (date of plea revealed in
Jolivet's first appeal), and Copeland entered
his plea in 1986. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1267.
In this case the record clearly shows that the
trial judge failed to comply with Gibbons and
Rule 11(5). The trial judge did not conduct an
on-the-record inquiry concerning Gentry's
understanding of the nature and elements of
the offense as required by Rule ll(5)(d). The
trial court simply determined that because
Gentry was present at trial, he was aware of
the evidence which had been admitted and the
charges against him. However, his understanding of the elements of the crime charged
and how those elements relate to the evidence
presented may not be presumed from his mere
presence during trial.. See Valencia, 776 P.2d
at 1335. We furtherTmd it particularly necessary to require strict Rule 11 compliance in
this instance, where Gentry contends his
hearing disability prevented him from understanding everything that went on during the
trial as well as during the proceedings regarding his guilty plea.
Rule 11(5) and Gibbons require the vacating
of Gentry's guilty plea on the ground that it
was not knowingly and voluntarily made. See
State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989).
Thus, we reverse and remand to allow Gentry
to withdraw his guilty plea and to proceed to a
new trial on the original charges.4 In light of
our decision, we do not reach Gentry's other
claims.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
1. The State argues that this appeal is moot since
Gentry will complete his eighteen month probation
before this court's opinion issues. We do not agree
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because the conditions of Gentry's probation, inclCite as
uding his promise to abandon both his pending civil
141 Utah Adv. Rep. 29
action and any interest in the ranch, will continue
despite completion of probation.
2. In 1989, the subsection in former Rule 11(e) was
IN T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
redesignated as Rule 11(5). See 1989 Utah Laws, ch.
O F THE S T A T E O F U T A H
65, §2.
3. In Stale v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989), this court used "the record as a
PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
whole" language in the opinion, but the issue argued
by appellant was that he did not voluntarily plead FILED:
guilty, because he mistakenly relied on the state's
assurance that it would recommend probation rather (Case Name; Supreme Court Number; Date
Filed; Citation of Court of Appeals opinion)
than incarceration. Neither the state nor appellant
addressed the issue of whether Gibbons had resulted
in the demise of the "record as a whole" test. The- State v. Jonas, 900364, July 27, 1990, 135
Utah Adv. Rep. 38.
refore, we do not read Thurston as supporting the
state's position in this case.
Saunders v. Sharp, 900360, July 26, 1990, 135
4. Usually, when a guilty plea is rescinded the
Utah Adv. Rep. 68.
parties are to be placed in the position each had
before the contract was entered into. People v. DENIED:
Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 3d 256, 258, 182 Cal. (Case Name; Supreme Court Number; Date
Rptr. 426, 428 (1982); see also Wilson v. State, 698
Denied; Citation of Court of Appeals
S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc)
opinion)
(rejects prior case law dictum that permitting a
withdrawal of a guilty plea was, in effect, the gra- Cingolani v. Utah Power & Light, 900239,
nting of a new trial). This case, however, presents
July 20, 1990, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 43.
an unusual factual setting. Although the parties
represented to the trial court that all the evidence
had been presented prior to the change of plea, it is
not clear how Gentry would have proceeded had the
guilty plea not been entered. Further, Judge Eves
stated in his decision that the court was prepared to
determine that Gentry was proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt at the time of trial of both
charges, even if Gentry had not pled guilty. Since
neither counsel had presented closing arguments and
since it is possible that absent the guilty plea Gentry
would have produced further evidence, we find the
trial court's declaration of a guilty verdict at the
time of the plea nonbinding on remand. Consequently, we find that a new trial is essential to ensure
that Gentry has a fair hearing on the charges.
Provo, Utth
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